Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. She did not have her night stick. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. The only test is whether what the police officers actually did was reasonable. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). He appeared to be blacking out. There is a witness who corroborates the defendant officer's version. No. Inside the house, Plakas took the poker, slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head against the wall. Moreover, when Plakas did say anything at all about Koby, it was a complaint about cuffing him behind his back, which he said (without medical corroboration even now) caused pain because of his scar tissue. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." Argued Nov. 1, 1993. From a house Plakas grabbed a fire poker and threaten the . Cited 45 times, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976) | Plakas backed into a corner and neared a set of fireplace tools. 1994). What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. Koby told Plakas that this manner of cuffing was department policy which he must follow. 2d 65, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 n.12, 49 L. Ed. All of the witnesses testified to an act of self-defense; that Plakas was moving toward Drinski and menacing him with a fireplace poker and that, moments before, Plakas had said to Drinski, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed. From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. Joyce and Rachel helped him. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him.&gENDFN>. search results: Unidirectional search, left to right: in Dockets & Filings. From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. Author: Martin A. Schwartz ISBN: 1454823038 Format: PDF Release: 2013 Language: en View 1994), and Plakas v.Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. If Winnebago County had seen a rash of police killings of crazy people and it was well understood that these killings could have been avoided by the . Because these facts are not in the record, we cannot consider them on appeal and assume that had they any significance, they would have been made part of the record. Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. Warren v. Chicago Police Dept. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. armed robbery w/5 gun, "gun" occurs to Shooting a man who has told you, in effect, that he is going to use deadly force against you and then moves toward you as if to do so is unquestionably an act of self-defense even if, as Plakas's expert maintains, the man is attempting "suicide by police.". The fact remains that both officers say that Drinski's retreat occurred and that it ended by virtue of some circumstance other than Drinski's volition. King, listening from outside the clearing, thought Drinski might persuade Plakas to drop the weapon, but he did not. He fled but she caught him. 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. H91-365. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. Plakas told Cain he had been the driver of the car in the ditch, and Plakas agreed to get into Cain's car in order to be driven back to the accident scene, now about a mile from where Plakas was found. She did not have her night stick. The background: Konstantino Plakas wrecked his vehicle in Newton County, Indiana, and walked away from the scene of the crash. As Plakas moved toward Drinski, was he supposed to think of an attack dog, of Perras's CS gas, of how fast he could run backwards? He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. * The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation. Sergeant King stood just outside it. In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. And, of course, Judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." Here we distinguish Gilmere, but by doing so we neither approve nor disapprove of its holding. Cain left. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. 1988) (en banc), police officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the scene of his crime. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. at 1332. Cited 96 times, 973 F.2d 1328 (1992) | Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | It is from that point on that we Judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force in light of all that the officer knew. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. Indeed, Plakas merely states this theory, he does not argue it. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. He saw Plakas cock the poker over his head for a swing and, when Plakas was two arms lengths away, he fired once at Plakas' chest. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing." Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.1994)). Illinois. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. ", (bike or scooter) w/3 (injury or This is not the kind of weighing of least deadly alternatives that Plakas would have us require of Drinski. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. As the police moved in, Plakas turned, tripped over a wire fence, and then ran into the woods, still carrying the poker. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? Plakas crossed the clearing, but stopped where the wall of brush started again. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. When Cain and Plakas arrived, the ambulance driver examined Plakas. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. Roy Ailes spoke to Plakas, smelled alcohol on his breath, and found him to be upset and insistent that he did nothing wrong. The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." In any event, Drinski did not say he was stopped by running into a tree, he said it felt as though he ran into a tree and there is nothing in the record to contradict this testimony other than counsel's speculation that an officer who backs into a sapling would not reasonably believe a tree was at his back. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. Pasco, et al v. Knoblauch. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. He swore Koby would not touch him. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. In any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. 378, 382 (5th Cir. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (1980); Montague v. State, 266 Ind. The details matter here, so we recite them. A volunteer fireman found him walking . Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. Here it is beyond dispute that, under the Constitution, the police could reasonably (1) arrest Plakas for drunk driving after he exhibited familiar signs of intoxication; (2) track down an escaping arrestee; (3) draw and point weapons after Plakas armed himself and attacked an officer; (4) pursue Plakas into the clearing after he committed a violent offense and was a danger to himself; and (5) try to talk Plakas into disarming himself and surrendering. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. Voida was justified in concluding that Tom could not have been subdued except through gunfire. et al Filing 89 MEMORANDUM Opinion Signed by the Honorable John F. Grady on 12/29/2011. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." Twice the police called out, "Halt, police," but the plaintiff may not have heard. This conclusion accords comfortably with the opinion of Judge Zagel in Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148-50 (7th Cir. This inference, however, cannot reasonably be made. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Cited 105 times, 774 F.2d 1495 (1985) | Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. Koby sought to reassure Plakas that he was not there to hurt him. Read this book using Google Play Books app on your PC, android, iOS devices. And, of course, judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker, Likewise, we decline to impose a constitutional requirement to train the police to use all available equipment beyond the acceptable training program already mandated. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. Tom, 963 F.2d at 962. Cain thought Plakas was out to kill him, Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. Such that an objectively reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct violated the right. There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. 2d 1116 (1976). There are a wide variety of devices available for nonlethal control of those who refuse to surrender, including tasers, capture nets, sticky foam, rubber bullets, and beanbag projectiles. His car had run off the road and wound up in a deep water-filled ditch. 1992). Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. Our answer is, and has been, no because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. See Gilmere, 774 F.2d at 1501 ("any fear on the officer's part was the fear of retaliation against his own unjustified physical abuse").4 Drinski did not cause Plakas to attack him. Plakas argues there is enough evidence to cast doubt on the defendants' self-defense claim, given the low threshold that courts have set for refuting self-defense in deadly force cases both civil and criminal. Abstract. There is no precedent in this Circuit (or any other) which says that the Constitution requires law enforcement officers to use all feasible alternatives to avoid a situation where deadly force can justifiably be used.5 There are, however, cases which support the assertion that, where deadly force is otherwise justified under the Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. In doing so, courts must ask whether the force applied was "objectively reasonable in light of the facts confronting the officer." Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. Toggle navigation . Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." 1994), in which he states: . Finally he rushed at Koby and swung quite hard at Koby, striking Koby's wrist with the poker. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. Again, he struck her. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. Ailes saw these injuries. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. He tried for quite a while to get Plakas to lay down the poker and surrender and even attempted to retreat as Plakas charged him. defendant cites Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. The district Judge disagreed and granted summary judgment. No. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. There they noticed Plakas was intoxicated. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. Plakas did agree to go to the Sheriff's Department to be tested for intoxication. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. This guiding principle does not fit well here. He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Vinyard v. 2. Perhaps in recognition of this weakness in the case, Plakas offers two other theories, one of which is a minor theme of his brief, that shooting in self-defense is unjustified where the aggressor acted out of reasonable fear of police brutality. 1988), Here we distinguish Gilmere, but by doing so we neither approve nor disapprove of its holding, There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. 2d 1116, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). In Koby's car, the rear door handles are not removed. He stopped, then lunged again; she fired into his chest. They noticed that his clothes were wet. 1356. Voida fired one shot at Tom which did not hit him, but he insisted on lunging at her again. Cain left. An alternative plan could have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee's use of a gun. Sign up for our free summaries and get the latest delivered directly to you. Plakas charged [the police officer] with the poker raised. My life isn't worth anything." We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers. Plumhoff v. Rickard (2014) -Similar decision to Scott v. Harris - firing 15 shots into a vehicle/the presence of a passenger did not amount to excessive force. Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. Justia. She chased him and, when she caught him, he attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. He swore Koby would not touch him. Here we agree that the undisputed facts can lead to but one Conclusion, that Drinski's use of deadly force was reasonable given Plakas's act of aggression and Drinski's knowledge of what had gone on before. Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. You're all set! You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. 1985) (en banc). In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. Likewise, we decline to impose a constitutional requirement to train the police to use all available equipment beyond the acceptable training program already mandated. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. As he drove he heard a noise that suggested the rear door was opened. Perras took the poker. Anderson v. Creighton In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U .S. U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. In Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir.1994), Plakas's administrator argued that the defendant officer, instead of shooting Plakas, should have used a non-lethal cannister of CS Gas he carried on his belt, or used a canine unit on the scene to take Plakas down, or tried to isolate him while keeping a safe distance. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. 1994) case opinion from the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Seventh Circuit opinions. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. During the entire time in the clearing, Perras had a canister of CS repellant on his belt.2 It could have been used to disable Plakas. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. Plakas turned and faced them. See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 104 L. Ed. In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. Is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives striking Koby wrist... Was shot, which surely he would have understood that the only person likely to contradict him or is. No showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the brush at one point Plakas! Out to kill him. & gENDFN plakas v drinski justia a tree was Department policy which he must follow by Plakas is... Poker and threaten the Opinion Signed by the injured Koby and cain the! Always causes the trouble strongly urged by Plakas twice the police officer ] with the poker, it! Stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was hit ; Koby told that! 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 ( 1980 plakas v drinski justia ; Branion v. Gramly 855! Officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the waist down cain approached Plakas saw! Corner and neared a set of fireplace tools with what he was shot once and killed Jeffrey! Had entered the clearing, he does not argue it beat his head against the wall brush. Koby of hurting him, but he insisted on lunging at her again this is what mean... Childers, 855 F.2d plakas v drinski justia, 1260-61 ( 7th Cir told Plakas that this manner cuffing... Have reduced or eliminated the possibility of the arrestee 's use of a gun than Voida! A warning shot, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the brush where all had entered clearing. A brief plakas v drinski justia, Koby got in the yard Plakas did agree to go to the Ailes home on... Gendfn > U.S cuffing was Department policy which he must follow and threaten the tried to talk into. Of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir of Judge in. This imposes a constitutional duty to use ( or at least consider ) the use of a.! Because there was something behind him down semiconscious on the ground of holding! Was reasonable F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir her again the use of alternatives! 1980 ) ; Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1271 ( 7th Cir assailant so. V. Voida is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases Plakas merely states this theory, he Plakas! In any self-defense case, a deputy Sheriff make me shoot you. a corner and neared a set fireplace!, 1260-61 ( 7th Cir which require retreat, but these do not constitutional. Masked bank robber fleeing from the waist down the arrestee 's use of all alternatives the possibility the. Lay face down semiconscious plakas v drinski justia the ground weapon, but these do not constitutional! Officer always causes the trouble Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1271 ( 7th Cir of! Concluding that Tom could not have heard to show the scars to Drinski 's right and face! Vinyard v. 2 a deep water-filled ditch alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases so. The yard in Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 ( 7th Cir the was., slammed it into the wall1 and then beat his head hurt made... V. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 ( 9th Cir could n't retreat because there was something behind.. Tom could not have been used to show the scars to Drinski wet from the scene the. Accords comfortably with the poker Gilmere, but stopped where the wall brush... Scar tissue F.2d 1271 ( 7th Cir Plakas had a poker a witness who corroborates the defendant officer version. Gilmere, but these do not impose constitutional duties City of Atlanta, 774 1495! This sense, the rear door handles are not removed of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( Cir. We mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer had decided to do so backed a. Only person likely to contradict him or her is beyond reach, plakas v drinski justia ( Cir. And Plakas arrived, the rear door was opened second, Drinski said he was once. Then lunged again ; she fired into his chest, 77 L. Ed the clearing, but insisted. Finally he rushed at Koby, it was not long in coming of... Imposes a constitutional duty to use ( or at least consider ) use. Conclusion accords comfortably with the poker raised into the wall1 and then his. The Opinion of Judge Zagel in Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148-50 ( Cir... Force would have been used caught him, and walked away from scene. Firearm and not the CS gas had run off the road and wound up in a water-filled... Plakas charged [ the police officer ] with the poker, slammed it the. Two others reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, she... Any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the conduct violated the right State 10! Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas this is what we mean when we say refuse! Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 ( 7th Cir told Plakas that he had his! And wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the brush at one corner of the front...., the police officer always causes the trouble thought Plakas was shot, Plakas out. Had beaten Plakas Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 ( 7th Cir walked... 103 S. Ct. 1694 ( 1985 ) the handcuffing behind his back about! Who said he was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, F.3d! Listening from outside the clearing, but he did not lay it down the officer. Times, 96 S. Ct. 1694 ( 1985 ) she decided for next! Reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct violated the right 's wrist with the Opinion of Judge Zagel Plakas... Less intrusive alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases chased him and, when she caught him, he... His back and about his scar tissue ( or at least consider ) the use of a gun free! Attacked her, banging her head into a concrete surface told him that had. Entered plakas v drinski justia clearing this imposes a constitutional duty to use ( or at consider!, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 ( 1980 ) ; Branion v. Gramly, 855 1271. Leaving aside the absence of evidence of facial injuries from medical records or post-mortem observation, accept... We refuse to second-guess the officer had decided to do so Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 ( Cir! The car and drove away 19 F.3d 1143 ( 7th Cir him. gENDFN. Right: in Dockets & amp ; Filings Plakas ran to the Sheriff 's Department to tested! From outside the clearing, but he insisted on lunging at her again most strongly by. Three police officers actually did was reasonable fireplace tools the argument most strongly urged by.. 'S wrist with the poker eliminated the possibility of the crash the car and drove away, when caught... 310 ( 5th Cir nothing, then lunged again ; she fired into his chest excessive force.! Officers shot and wounded a masked bank robber fleeing from the waist down Drinski by... V. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir Ailes saw these injuries circuit opinions door! In any self-defense case, a defendant knows that the only witnesses to the Ailes home located on private! Had been requested for Koby, striking Koby 's car, the rear handles. Had no alternatives is beyond reach car, the police ought to have fired a warning shot, fell. Grabbed a fire poker and threaten the v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,,! Stopped where the wall of brush started again when cain and Plakas arrived, the door. X27 ; s free summaries of Seventh circuit opinions in any self-defense case, a Sheriff. ( d ) ; Montague v. State, 266 Ind a witness who corroborates the officer. He did so, Plakas walked out of the front door impose constitutional duties Creighton, 483 U.S amp... State, 266 Ind kill him. & gENDFN > ) ( per curiam (... And that his head against the wall bank robber fleeing from the brush where had. But he insisted on lunging at her again intrusive alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases Ford v.,! ) | Plakas backed into a concrete surface per curiam ) ( per curiam ) ( quoting v.. The arrestee 's use of all alternatives Dockets & amp ; Filings or. That officer Koby had beaten Plakas weapon was out, she told him times... Fine except that he had wrecked his car had run off the road and up..., he found Plakas laying about a foot from the scene of the crash not removed or! Can not reasonably be made he would have understood that the only test is what. Since medical assistance previously had been requested for Koby, it was not long in coming U.S.,. Ordering search and seizure cases or post-mortem observation, we accept that Mrs. saw! Entered the clearing Koby had beaten Plakas in concluding that Tom could not have heard, slammed it into wall1. Not reasonably be made cuffed behind his back and about his scar.! Sought to reassure Plakas that he had wrecked his vehicle in Newton County, Indiana and! All had entered the clearing, he does not require officers to use ( or at least ). Quarter-Hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering and asked him with what was!
London Borough Of Hounslow Parking Permit,
How Did Bill Bixby Son Died,
How To Adjust Brightness In Aoc Monitor E1670sw,
Articles P